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EMINENT DOMAIN REVISITED AND
SOME LAND USE PROBLEMS
Robert Kratovil*
INTRODUCTION
Since the author and a colleague last addressed the broader problems of
eminent domain some thirty years ago,' a gradual erosion of property rights
has crept into judicial decisions. In particular, the concept of inverse con-
demnation for the overregulation of land use has become a ripe battleground
between land regulators and real estate developers. Noted commentators
have published a multitude of articles dealing with the problem of inverse
condemnation. 2 Court decisions have multiplied. Nevertheless, satisfactory
answers in this area remain elusive.
To begin, any destruction of a private property right by a public body
creates a potential eminent domain problem.' Under the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments4 and state due process and eminent
domain provisions,' private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation. In addition, many state constitutions require that com-
pensation be paid when property is merely taken or damaged by a public
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School; J.D., DePaul University.
1. Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596
(1954).
2. Commentators have been particularly prolific in discussing the inverse condemnation
problem. For some of the leading articles, see Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate-Is That
the Question? Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and
Private Property Rights, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 253 (1975); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County
in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63;
Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain: A Candle in the Dark Corner of the Law, 52 J.
URB. L. 861 (1975); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public
Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 3; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Van Alstyne, Taking
or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1970).
3. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
4. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part: "nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
v. This limitation on the power of the federal government is, in practical effect, made applicable
to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 235-41 (1897).
5. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law ..." Article 1, § 15 is the eminent domain clause.
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body.6 Thus, in jurisdictions with "or damaged" provisions, landowners
confronted with restrictive zoning rules, or land use regulations, that exces-
sively "damage" their property may seek redress by attacking the constitu-
tionality of the regulation as applied to their land.
In states without "or damaged" constitutional provisions, the landowner
may claim that governmental action that severely impinges upon property
rights results in a de facto taking that requires compensation. 7 Rather than
seeking relief that declares the action invalid, the landowner may seek
compensation for the actual injury suffered.' In fact, taking by the condem-
nor for its own use is characteristic of the old concept of eminent domain.
The newer concept asserts that taking away from the landowner gives rise
to an equal right to compensation. If a landowner is deprived of property
rights it makes littl'e difference whether the government acquired or destroyed
those rights. In either case, the rights are lost.9
Although a reading of the current literature might legitimately lead one
to infer that inverse condemnation is a recently contrived remedy, this
inference is erroneous. This article will attempt to put the "taking issue" in
perspective by tracing the origins of inverse condemnation, examining the
delicate balance between social gains and individual losses, and discussing
the means employed to determine what governmental action constitutes a
"taking" of property.
In so doing, this article will critically examine some newer doctrines that,
in seeking to protect the public, ignore the fundamental rights of landowners.
For example, by refusing to permit inverse condemnation actions, some
courts have allowed governmental bodies to impose unreasonable land reg-
ulations on developers while circumventing the just compensation com-
mand. "'
6. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19: "Private property may be taken or damaged for
public use when just compensation ... has first been paid ...... For a summary of the
various state constitutions containing the "or damaged" provisions, see 2A P. NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 6.26 (Rohan ed. 1984).
7. See Kanner, supra note 2, at 882 (property is a group of rights and, therefore, substantial
interference with these rights is a taking although title and right to possession are not disturbed).
8. A whole range of remedies is presented. For example, a developer may seek a declaration
that an infringing zoning ordinance be declared invalid as applied to the project so that
construction on the project may proceed. A homeowner may seek an injunction against an
airport proposal to increase flight patterns over his dwelling. Finally, the landowner may simply
seek damages by way of inverse condemnation against a municipality for damages suffered
from excessive regulation of his land.
9. For a discussion of the nature and definition of governmental taking, see F. BOSSELMAN,
D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF
LAND USE CONTROL (1973) [hereinafter cited as F. BOSSELMAN, THE TAKING ISSUE]. See infra
notes 44-47 and accompanying text for a critique of this work. THE TAKING ISSUE should be
regarded as a good collection of authorities. Its conclusions, however, are questionable.
10. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979) (denying inverse condemnation action despite allegation that zoning ordinance deprived
landowner of substantially all use of property), aff'd, 477 U.S. 255 (1980); HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975) (denying inverse
condemnation action despite allegation that zoning ordinance diminished property value from
$388,000 to $75,000), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
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According to some recent theories, neither federal nor state constitutions
allow compensation for land use regulations that effectively deprive land-
owners of the beneficial use of their land. It is one thing to favor beneficial
land use controls and environmental protection. It is, however, another
matter to categorically deny any compensation to landowners in the name
of the public interest when their land is stripped of its value. This result is
clearly inequitable and constitutionally impermissible. If the phrase "eminent
domain" has any meaning, that meaning is that property is protected by the
judicial branch against the other branches of state and federal government.
Awarding monetary compensation is an integral part of the pattern of
protection, as is invalidation of excessive regulation. At times, however,
invalidation provides inadequate protection.
I. ORIGINS OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION-
"OR DAMAGED" CONSTITUTIONS
Inverse condemnation is actually much older than commentators assert.
In fact, an action at law for inverse condemnation against a local government
was recognized at least as early as 1882. In Rigney v. City of Chicago," a
landowner instituted an action for damages against the city of Chicago. The
city had constructed a viaduct along the street on which plaintiff's land
abutted, and thereby deprived the plaintiff of access to the street. Upon
review, the Illinois Supreme Court noted the new provision in the Illinois
Constitution of 1870, which declared that "private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."'' 2 The court
found that the just compensation requirement was triggered when there was
direct physical obstruction or injury that caused damage to the landowner's
right of enjoyment in excess of that sustained by the public generally. 3 The
court therefore held that an action for damages did lie against the city.'
4
Plainly, Rigney is an inverse condemnation case. Had the court so chosen,
it could have dismissed the case and required the plaintiff to mandamus the
city to condemn the property. Instead, the Rigney court chose to sanction
a simple procedure that permitted the landowner to achieve the same result
by bringing an action at law for damages. Thus, at its inception, inverse
condemnation was simply a procedural convenience, an alternative remedy
in states with "or damaged" constitutional provisions.
The Rigney case, of course, has great substantive importance. It was the
first case in which the first "or damaged" constitutional provision was
construed by the judiciary. The Rigney court squarely held that the phrase
"or damaged" does not refer to mere physical damage, but also includes
damage caused to intangible property rights. According to Rigney, a plaintiff
11. 102 Ill. 64 (1882).
12. Id. at 75.
13. Id. at 78.
14. Id. at 81.
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need only prove special damages and a direct physical disturbance of a right
which is enjoyed in connection with the property.'5
Twenty-four years after the Rigney case was decided, another decision
appeared in which the issue was first expressed in modern jargon. In Newport
v. Temscal Water Co.,' 6 a landowner sought to enjoin a water company
from taking water from land in a manner prejudicial to plaintiff's legal
rights. While the California Supreme Court sympathized with the landowner's
plight, it held that an injunction should not be granted since the inhabitants
of the town would be left without water. Instead, the court reasoned that
when public interests are involved and damages are ascertainable, injunctive
relief should be denied and monetary recovery should be allowed. Such an
action, the court stated, "should be regarded in its nature as the reverse of
an action in condemnation."'
7
The "or damaged" approach to condemnation quickly became popular.
West Virginia adopted an "or damaged" constitutional provision in 1872,
and thereafter over half of the states took similar action. By explicitly
providing for property damage recovery, the "or damaged" constitutional
provisions made a substantial addition to the bundle of rights we regard as
''property."
11. MODERN INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Eminent domain litigation has shifted decidedly to the issue of overregu-
lation. 2" With the advent of post-World War I1 land development on an
enormous scale, real estate values skyrocketed. 2' A concomitant increase in
urbanization heightened concern over the environmental consequences of
rapid growth. These parallel developments led to an ever-widening rift
between those who desired stringent land use regulations and those who
15. Id. The Rigney court further noted that the English courts, in construing similar statutes
that provided compensation for injuries occasioned by public improvements, laid down similar
rules providing for damage recovery even when the governmental action was not a complete
taking. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 7 L.R.-C.P. 508 (1872) (Housc
of Lords approval of statutory compensation scheme to protect property "injuriously affected"
by public actions).
16. 149 Cal. 415, 87 P. 372 (1906).
17. Id. at 418, 87 P. at 375.
18. See 2A P. NIcHOLS supra note 6.
19. See Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Coindemnnation: A
Legislative Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 15 (1967) (historically, damage clauses were
included in state constitutions to enlarge compensation beyond traditional taking cases where
courts required physical invasion of the property).
20. See Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 447 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court's recent Taking Clause decisions teach that non-physical government
intrusion on private property, such as zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions, have
become the rule rather than the exception.") (emphasis in original).
21. While there were a few large-scale land developments in earlier times, nothing in world
history equals the phenomenal growth of post-World War II land development that occurred,
for instance, in California.
[Vol. 34:587
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sought protection of their valuable property investments. Of course, these
adversarial groups found their way to the courtroom to resolve disputes.
The California courts have been extremely active in adjudicating these
regulatory disputes. In part, this may be the result of the phenomenal post-
World War II growth of land development in California. But it is also no
secret that California courts have been especially receptive to rigorous land
use regulation at the expense of developers.22 The clash between developers
and regulators, with California as the battleground, will figure prominently
in this article.
A. Attitudes of Local Officials and Governments
Local officials have not maintained an exemplary record with respect to
landowners' rights. For example, in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San
Diego,3 Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion a particularly dis-
turbing comment by a city official. Brennan quoted a city attorney who
addressed the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in California as
saying that a city could "amend the regulation and start over again" if it
lost a zoning suit. 24 Time and time again, land use regulations have been
found invalid as infringements upon the rights of landowners, but just
compensation has eluded the landowners' grasp. Local governments simply
add new twists to their previous regulations. The battle simply begins anew.
Developers' lawyers have been saying this for years; namely, that local
governments will resort to any tactics, no matter how despicable, to block
unwanted developments.2"
Today, the flouting of federal and state constitutional requirements begins
with the enactment of the zoning ordinance. Local governments often zone
large areas for impossible uses, such as agriculture or industry.2 6 In this
22. The California courts have viewed large-scale development activity with undisguised
aversion. California zoning decisions are noted for their anti-developer bias. See, e.g., I N.
WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 6.03 at 115 (1974)
("The striking feature of California zoning law is that the courts in that state have quite
consistently been far rougher on the property rights of developers than those in any other
state.")
23. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
24. Id. at 655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25. See Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Compensation? 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 765, 799 (1973) (indicating that some condemnation cases encourage governmental officials
to act irresponsibly and fraudulently so long as no physical invasion of ownership interests
occurs); Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages
Remedy in Challenging Land Use Restrictions, 29 UCLA L. REV. 711, 733-34 (1982) (landowners
challenging "takings" are vulnerable to a "bewildering series of multiple agency restrictions,
buck-passing and dillatory vacillations," and there is little courts can do to prevent this
administrative treadmill effect); see also Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 76 I11. App. 2d 62,
221 N.E.2d 323 (2d Dist. 1966) (when city continues to change zoning during pendency of
appeal in effort to block apartment construction, court may invalidate zoning and frame decree
to prevent flouting of judicial process), aff'd on rehearing, 93 111. App. 2d 24, 235 N.E.2d 23,
ceri. denied, 393 U.S 1084 (1967).
26. See R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 9 (1973).
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manner, residential developers are forced to seek rezoning, thereby providing
local officials with a chance to inspect the developer. The original zoning
map is, at times, a constitutional monstrosity. While many still contend that
regulatory takings occur rarely, or that the remedy of injunction is sufficient,
these contentions are difficult to reconcile with the wide-spread disregard of
property rights in modern land use control law.
B. Police Power vs. Eminent Domain-
"Taking A way" and Overregulation
At times, landowners and others are called upon to share in a general
loss. Thus, under certain circumstances, property may be lawfully destroyed
(taken away from the landowner) under a government's police power without
compensation of any kind. If a person owns land improved with a building,
and the authorities, dealing with a conflagration, deem it necessary to destroy
the building to create a fire break, this is damnum absque injuria, an injury
without legal redress.27 This was precisely the procedure involved in the vain
attempt to halt the great San Francisco fire, since an earthquake had
destroyed the water mains. Under such circumstances, the public need is so
great that all private rights must give way before it.
Public welfare concerns of a lesser magnitude also have resulted in huge
non-compensable wipeouts of property values. For example, in Hadacheck
v. Los Angeles, 8 the City of Los Angeles had enacted an ordinance that
prohibited the manufacture of bricks within specified city limits. The plain-
tiff, who owned brick clay deposits and a brick factory within the limited
area, was convicted of a misdemeanor for violating the ordinance. Plaintiff's
land value was about $800,000 if used for brick-making purposes, but only
$60,000 if used for residential purposes. In effect, the ordinance compelled
the plaintiff to abandon his business entirely. The plaintiff, therefore, charged
that the ordinance amounted to a taking of property without compensation
in violation of due process. 29
The Supreme Court in Hadacheck refused to compensate plaintiff for his
huge loss, noting that the police power is "one of the most essential powers
of government, one that is the least limitable." 3" The Court declared that
"there must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the way
they must yield to the good of the community."' The Court found that the
state's purpose in enacting the ordinance-to improve the health and comfort
of the community by eliminating the fumes, smoke, and soot of the plaintiff's
brickmaking operations-was sufficiently compelling to justify the depriva-
tion without compensation.3 2
27. See Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879); Holtz v. Superior Court of City
of San Francisco, 3 Cal. 3d 307, 475 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970); see also J. MILLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 5 (1879).
28. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
29. Id. at 398.
30. Id. at 410.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Similarly, in Miller v. Schoene,33 a Virginia statute required red cedar trees
within two miles of any apple orchard to be cut down when the trees were
found to have a communicable plant disease. The plaintiffs argued that their
cedar trees could not be destroyed by the government simply to preserve the
property values of the apple orchard owners. The Court, however, held that,
under the state's police power, the state may destroy one class of property
to save another which is of greater value to the public.14 When the public
interest is involved, the Court reasoned, the state may exercise its police
power even to the extent of destroying property interests without compen-
sation. 5
It is well-established that in exercising the power of eminent domain and
taking fee simple title, the condemnor, theoretically, pays the full market
value.16 Yet, the same public body can, without compensation, lawfully
destroy immense property values under its police power.3 7 Courts have
struggled to relieve this inherent tension between police power and eminent
domain. 8
33. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
34. Id. at 279.
35. Id. at 277-80.
36. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 326 U.S. 372, 377 (1945).
37. To a layman there is nothing mysterious about condemnation without compensation.
Thinking in the old, easily understood way about eminent domain as a taking by the public
for a public use, why shouldn't full value be paid? And if a tract of land needs regulating for
the public good, the layman will tell you that it is folly to consider paying compensation to
landowners. The ordinary understandings of ordinary people, including their expectations about
the risk of regulation, have been suggested as an approach to the taking issue. See Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed. Why the Taking Issue is Still in a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 598 (1984).
Alas, the real world is a good deal too complex to lend itself to simple solutions.
38. The only thread of unanimity in the countless writings in this area is that the courts
are adrift in a sea of confusion. See, e.g., Broeder, Torts and Just Compensation: Some
Personal Reflections, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 228 (1965) (characterizing the case law as highly
ambiguous and irreconcilable); Dunham, supra note 2, at 63 (describing takings cases as forming
a "crazy-quilt pattern"); Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulation, 15 GA. L.
REV. 559, 563-64 (1981) (noting that the courts' identification of takings has been notoriously
confused); Mulligan, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation: Another Excur-
sion into the Takings Dilemma, 17 URB. LAW. 109, 110 (1985) (noting the absence of absolute
standards and ensuing uncertainty from Supreme Court guidance in "takings" area); Van
Alstyne, supra note 2, at 2 (describing the cases as "characterized by confusing and incompatible
results, often explained in conclusory terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric");
Comment, Finding a Taking: Standards for Fairness, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 743, 746 (1982)
(reluctance of Supreme Court to set down clean standards for "taking" results in great
uncertainty in reviewing state action).
Other commentators have attempted to find the line drawn by courts between valid regulation
and de facto taking. Unfortunately, the results of this inquiry are inconclusive. Compare R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.27 (2d ed. 1976) (concluding that while no precise
formula exists to determine where regulation crosses line to become confiscation, financial loss
is a relevant, but not decisive, consideration), with Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable
Regulations for Open Space, 29 AM. INST. PLANNERS 87, 89 (1963) (estimating the average
breaking point between valid regulation and "taking" to be "a loss of two-thirds of the
admitted value for some other use"). In any event, the search for a mathematical average
breaking point may be of little value considering the diversity of judicial opinion with respect
to compensable takings resulting from governmental overregulation. See Berger, A Policy
Analysis of the Taking Problem, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 175 n.35 (1974).
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The leading case in this area is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3 9 In
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court examined a statute that forbade the mining
of anthracite coal without leaving pillars for surface support. This right was
explicitly reserved in the company's mineral deeds. The coal company claimed
that the public body lacked authority to enact such a statute, and brought
an action for damages. In a majority opinion written by Justice Holmes,
the Court recognized that it faced the difficult question of whether the police
power could be stretched so as to destroy the coal company's property
rights.4" The Court noted that while not every government action that
diminishes property values requires damages, when the diminution reaches
a certain magnitude there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
payment of compensation.4 '
Holmes made his now-famous statement that "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking." '4 2 The Court concluded with this warning: "We are in danger
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is
not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." 43 Pennsylvania Coal was the
first intimation that overregulation might subject a governmental body to
the payment of compensation. It triggered a burning controversy. Those
favoring strict regulation of land use remain opposed to Pennsylvania Coal
even today.
Pennsylvania Coal prompted a belated and unprecedented response from
the executive branch. In 1973 the Executive Office of the President's Council
on Environmental Quality published a monograph entitled "The Taking
Issue." 44 Upon even a cursory examination it is clear that the monograph
was intended not to illuminate, but to persuade. The foreword to the
monograph expressed the hope that the study "will serve to clarify and
inform public debate, in order that America's future can be better served
by a more rational system of land use policies and controls." 45 In short, as
its able authors pointed out, the monograph was a brief that argued that
Pennsylvania Coal should be overruled. The monograph assaulted Justice
Holmes' reasoning in Pennsylvania Coal. Among the many charges levelled,
the monograph asserted that Holmes rewrote the Constitution by liberally
construing the concept of taking to include non-physical interference with
property rights.
Scholars have vigorously attacked the monograph. 46 In this author's view,
"The Taking Issue" was doomed to failure from the very beginning. The
39. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
40. Id. at 413.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 415.
43. Id. at 416.
44. See F. BOSSELMAN, THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 9.
45. Id. at 122.
46. One must remember that THE TAKING ISSUE was written at the height of the concern
over the destruction of marshes and coastal wetlands by the developers. The case for preservation
[Vol. 34:587
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Supreme Court has shown no inclination to retreat from its opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal. In fact, the Court often cites the case and approves its
general balancing technique.47
When Pennsylvania Coal was decided, on December 11, 1922, it initially
attracted some attention, but not a great deal. A few student notes appeared,
but none were critical.4" Zoning at that time was still in limbo. A widely
held opinion viewed zoning as violative of the federal constitution. From
1923 to recent times the viability of Pennsylvania Coal was not under attack.
Constitutional law was taught and articles by authorities on constitutional
law appeared periodically. It was not until the post-World War II invasion
of wetlands has been stated by others. See Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A
Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1972). In fact,
environmental concern for wetlands resulted in some remarkable decisions. For example, in
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), the court preserved wetlands
by holding that a landowner has no constitutional right to develop his land-a rather unusual
holding for a state that is considered a pioneer in the purchase and condemnation of development
rights for the creation of scenic easements. See Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142
N.W.2d 793 (1966).
Other decisions construing wetlands or flood plain regulation have displayed an obvious
pro-regulation or anti-regulation bias. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151
Conn. 304 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (pro-landowner flood plain decision); State v. Johnson, 265
A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (pro-landowner wetlands holding); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 350
Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970) (pro-landowner wetland decision). Compare Morris County
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippanny-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232
(1963) (praising virtues of landowner rights in wetlands situation) with Gibson v. State, 115
N.H. 137, 336 A.2d 239 (1975) (upholding state's regulation on similar facts). For thoughtful
articles on the wetlands problem, see Berger, supra note 2, at 260; Large, This Land is Whose
Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wts. L. REV. 1039. In any case, the
CEQ, which sponsored THE TAKING ISSUE, rejected the authors' argument that Pennsylvania
Coal should be overruled. See Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the
Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS
L.J. 15, 41 (1984). Oddly, the Supreme Court seems to overlook this. See Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, infra note 80, at 3122, n.15.
47. See Berger, supra note 2, at 258-63; Corker, Limits to "The Petty Larceny of the Police
Power", 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 67, 81 (1976); Benson, Book Review, 7 Loy. L. REV.
652 (1974); Hagman, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 482 (1973). For more recent Supreme
Court cases citing Pennsylvania Coal and utilizing the several balancing techniques, see Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Whatever else remains
in doubt, Pennsylvania Coal seems carved in stone.
48. For a cursory discussion of Pennsylvania Coal in "recent cases" sections, see Comment
on Cases, Constitutional: Police Power v. Eminent Domain, 11 CALIF. L. REV. 188 (1923);
Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Legislative Powers: Impairment of the Obligation of Con-
tracts-Pennsylvania "Cave-In" Statute, 36 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1923); Note and Comment,
Constitutional Law-Police Power, Regulation and Confiscation, 21 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1923);
Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Police Power-Due Process-Mining-Surface Subsidence,
7 MINN. L. REV. 242 (1923); Recent Case, Police Power-Private Property, I TEX. L. REV.
354 (1923); Recent Case, Constitutional Law-Police Power-Kohler Act Held Unconstitutional,
71 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1923); Recent Decisons, Constitutional Law-Police Power-Taking
Property and Impairing Contractual Obligations by Exercise of State Police Power, 9 VA. L.
REV. 457 (1923).
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of old suburban areas by developers selling inexpensive homes that Penn-
sylvania Coal began to be criticized.49 It may be legitimately inferred that
had Pennsylvania Coal initially turned American constitutional law in a new
and unacceptable direction, it would have attracted adverse comment long
before World War 11 ended."
There are complaints from time to time that Pennsylvania Coal "gives no
yardstick for the degree of interference that constitutes a taking." 5 ' In this
author's view, this is analogous to complaining that the Bible provides no
yardstick for telling us what the Lord will decide on Judgment Day. The
line-drawing technique of Pennsylvania Coal requires a balancing of interests.
When the purported reason for the governmental action is weak, and the
resultant interference with the beneficial use of the land is substantial, a
reviewing court may provide relief. Conversely, when a land use restriction
represents a paramount governmental interest and the interference with the
landowners' property rights is necessary, the court should deny recovery.
Thus, in the fire-break cases the preservation of the city from destruction
would outweigh all other interests. On the other hand, preservation of
wetlands would have been assigned minimal weight a century ago. Thus, the
factors weighed change with the times and the growth of human knowledge
concerning the world in which we live.
When balancing competing interests, courts must make value judgments.
No hard and fast rule is foreseeable. 2 Indeed, the Constitution is a structure
of law implicit with values: moral values, civic values, and social values."
Assigning value to the interests involved in taking cases remains a major
task of the courts.5 4
Nevertheless, the battle lines have been drawn. On one side are regulators,
who would like to regulate land use for legitimate reasons, but without
compensating the landowner for any loss." Regulators are joined by local
officials who wish to stop all growth in their "tight little islands. ' 5 6 On the
other side are the land developers, who complain bitterly of the unprincipled
use of regulations to block developments on which the land developers have
spent fortunes. The developers are joined by those landowners who merely
49. See Sax, supra note 2, at 151 n.7.
50. For an early, supportive discussion of "taking" concepts in light of Pennsylvania Coal,
see Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596, 615
(1942).
51. Rose, supra note 37, at 566.
52. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 459, 463 (1978).
53. See Friedman, The Courts and Social Policy, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 558, 563 (1972).
54. For a discussion of the general balancing between social gains and private losses, see
infra text accompanying notes 88-106.
55. Many courts simply limit the plaintiff's remedy to invalidation of the governmental
regulation. Limiting the aggrieved landowner to invalidation ignores the real costs and damages
suffered while the regulation was in effect. See Morgan & Shonkwiler, Regulatory Takings in
Oregon: A Walk Down Fifth Avenue Without Due Process, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 591, 605
(1980); Comment, supra note 25, at 717.
56. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
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wish to preserve their property values and prevent unjust interference with
their property rights. A solution to this dilemma is needed.
C. The Brennan Taking Formula
The issue of inverse condemnation as a form of taking was raised in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego." In San Diego Gas, a land developer
challenged the validity of a land use regulation that effectively deprived the
developer of the beneficial use of his land. The plaintiff owned land that,
when purchased as a possible site for a nuclear power plant, was zoned for
industrial and agricultural use. The city rezoned parts of the property and
reduced the acreage for industrial use. The city also established an open-
space plan which encompassed the plaintiff's property and proposed that
the city acquire the land to preserve it as a parkland. The city never purchased
the land, but the zone remained intact.5 8 The plaintiff argued that the
governmental action constituted a taking that required just compensation.
By a narrow five to four majority, the United States Supreme Court dismissed
the plaintiff's appeal from the California Supreme Court since it determined
that the state court judgment was not final.5 9 Nevertheless, the case is
significant because a majority of the justices agreed on a valuation formula
that will hereafter be referred to as "the Brennan formula."
Justice Brennan's dissent clearly indicated that a government's exercise of
its regulatory police power may give rise to a taking that requires compen-
sation. Relying on Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Brennan reasoned that if a
regulation has denied a property owner all or most of his interest in the
property, a taking has occurred. He therefore determined that it would only
be fair for the public to bear the cost of the landowner's losses from the
time the regulation was applied until its ultimate recission by the govern-
ment.60
Justice Brennan then attacked the notion that even if a taking is found,
the landowner is limited to mere invalidation of the regulation. 6' Justice
Brennan stated that once a court finds that a police power regulation has
effected a taking, "the government entity must pay just compensation for
the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking'
and ending on the date the governmental entity chooses to rescind or
otherwise amend the regulation. "62
Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell agreed with Brennan's view and
joined in his dissent. 61 Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion in which
he agreed with Brennan's views, but doubted, along with other justices, that
the judgment on appeal was final. 64
57. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
58. Id. at 633.
59. Id. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 655 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 633.
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If the five justices correctly stated the applicable constitutional doctrine,
all states are bound by the Brennan formula .' 5 To be sure, the Brennan
formula is of limited scope. The formula deals with loss of use value during
a limited time period. But the formula does establish an important principle,
namely, that an action for money compensation is a constitutional remedy
for overregulation.
Some courts have adopted the Brennan formula in dealing with inverse
condemnation actions. For example, in Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water
District, 16 landowners brought an action against a water district and the city
for inverse condemnation. The plaintiff landowners claimed that the defend-
ants' enforcement of a flood-control program deprived them of all beneficial
economic uses of their property, and therefore resulted in a taking that
necessitated just compensation.' 7 The court of appeals rejected defendants'
argument that the only proper remedy was mandamus or declaratory relief.
Instead, the Martino court pointed to the Brennan formula in San Diego
Gas for the proposition that compensation could be recovered in inverse
condemnation. The Martino court, therefore, reversed the lower court's
summary judgment and remanded the case.'
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit endorsed the Brennan formula in Hamilton
Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission.'1 While the
Supreme Court subsequently disposed of the case on procedural grounds, 70
the appellate court's analysis continues to be of value. In Hamilton Bank,
the successor in interest of land developers sued the planning commission to
recover damages for a taking. The plaintiff alleged that the commission's
rezoning substantially dimished the value of the land. Although the land
had been zoned to permit cluster residential development, after the developer
expended three to five million dollars, the commission rezoned the land and
refused to approve any more plats. 7' The jury found that the commission
had denied the plaintiff an economically viable use of its property in violation
of the just compensation command. The district court granted the defendant
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the Sixth Circuit reversed."
65. Indeed, the Brennan formula is gaining acceptance as the controlling view. See Martino
v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 151
(1984); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981); Devines v. Maier, 655
F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981); Burrows v. City of Keenee, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981);
Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334
N.W.2d 67 (1983); see also 2 P. NIctOLS, supra note 6, at § 6.21 (6) at 6-154.
Of course, this "controlling view" may soon be transformed into a historical anecdote with
the Court's ultimate resolution of Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). See
infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
66. 703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 151 (1984).
67. Id. at 1144.
68. Id. at 1148, (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
636-61 (1981) (3rennan, J., dissenting).
69. 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
70. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
71. 729 F.2d at 403-404.
72. Id. at 409.
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The appellate court turned to Pennsylvania Coal for guidance and noted
that a taking need not be an actual physical occupation; governmental
regulation can constitute a taking.73 The court, however, stressed that a
taking does not occur when the government simply deprives an owner of
the best or most profitable use of the property. Also, mere diminution in
property value does not create a taking. Nonetheless, the court agreed with
expert opinion that the property had no remaining economically viable use
and, thus, was taken by the government.74
Turning to the compensation question, the Hamilton Bank court relied on
the Brennan formula articulated in San Diego Gas.75 The court quoted from
Justice Brennan's dissent, which noted the shortcomings of limiting recovery
to declaratory relief because mere invalidation does not compensate the
landowner for the economic loss he suffered during the time of the taking.
The court also agreed with Justice Brennan's view that invalidation would
not fulfill the just compensation clause's purpose of shifting the burden of
loss from the individual to the public. The court therefore agreed with the
Brennan formula and awarded damages for a temporary regulatory taking.716
While the Supreme Court recently reviewed the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Hamilton Bank," its decision was not dispositive of the principal issues upon
which the parties sought review. Rather, the Court devoted most of its
discussion to procedural aspects of the claim. The question of what remedies
are available in inverse condemnation proceedings therefore remains unan-
swered.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hamilton on
the ground that the plaintiff's failure to seek a variance for his property
prevented the state from making a final decision on what development was
permitted.78 The Court conceded that, while the plaintiff was not required
to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to bringing a section 1983 claim, 9
the administrative action must be final before it can be reviewed. 80 The
majority found the taking claim to be premature because the plaintiff had
not utilized Tennessee's inverse condemnation procedure prior to bringing
the action.8 Interestingly, the Court also noted that the regulations could
possibly be viewed as an impermissable exercise of the state's police power
rather than a fifth amendment taking; the impossibility of determining the
73. Id. at 405.
74. Id. at 406.
75. Id. at 408 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981)).
76. Id. at 409 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655-
57 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
77. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108
(1985).
78. Id. at 3117.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
80. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3120.
81. Id. at 3121.
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final effect of the regulations on the plaintiff's investment-backed profit
expectations would, therefore, also render the action premature . 2
The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, did not address the
issue of whether the Brennan formula would have been applicable had a
taking in fact occurrred. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the
majority opinion but asserted that the Brennan formula articulated in San
Diego Gas was still viable.83 Justice Stevens, however, while concurring in
the majority opinion, noted his dissatisfaction with the Brennan formula."
Justice Stevens reasoned that if the local government employed fair proce-
dures, it should not be held liable for the lost use of the land while the
legitimacy of the regulation was being litigated.85 Stevens' presumption that
governments act in good faith in establishing such regulations, however, is
unrealistic in light of Justice Brennan's depiction of what actually takes
place in the real world of land use regulation.16 Nothing in the Constitution
requires the Court to be guided by a myth that experience has exploded.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hamilton Bank evidences its desire to
avoid addressing the taking issue squarely. Unfortunately, the Court's erec-
tion of procedural road-blocks hinders the determination of substantive legal
issues."7 Whether the Brennan formula is the proper means for determining
damages in instances of governmental takings is a matter of enormous import
and should be addressed by the Court.
III. BALANCING SOCIAL GAINS AGAINST PRIVATE LOSSES
The test for the legitimacy of a police power action is to compare the
societal need for the measure, or the contemplated societal gain from it,
with the harm it will cause to the individual or class of individuals com-
plaining. If the social gains outweigh the individual losses, the measure is
deemed legitimate. 8 This balancing test was advocated by Pennsylvania
Coal,8" adopted by the Model Land Development Code, 9 and explicitly
approved by the Supreme Court. 9'
82. Id. at 3124. See also id. at 3123 (citing Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U.S. 135
(1907)) and contrast with infra text accompanying note 178.
83. Id. at 3124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 3125 (Stevens, J., concurring) Justice Rehnquist obviously disagrees. See supra
text accompanying note 64.
85. Id. at 3126-27 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also infra text accompanying note 25.
86. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
87. See Hamilton Bank, 105 S.Ct. at 3124 (White, J., dissenting).
88. See Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 1, at 609; Michelman, supra note 2, at 1193;
Ragsdale & Sher, The Court's Role in The Evolution of Power Over Land, 7 URB. LAW. 60,
79 (1975); Wright, Exclusionary Land Use Controls and the Taking Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 545, 567 (1981).
89. See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
90. For a discussion of the general balancing technique required by the Code, see Haley,
Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due Process of a Taking
Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REV. 315 (1979). Haley noted that it was the Kratovil
& Harrison article, supra note 1, that introduced the balancing concept into the periodical
literature on eminent domain. Id. at 316 n.7.
91. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 361 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
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For example, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,92 the Supreme
Court analyzed petitioner's argument that compelling a shopping center to
permit the exercise of free expression on its grounds amounted to a taking
of petitioner's property rights under the fifth amendment. The Court deter-
mined that the appropriate inquiry was whether the restriction on private
property forced some people "to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 93 This public versus
private balancing included, according to the Court, an inquiry into the
character of the governmnental action, its economic effect, and the degree
of interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Balancing
these equities, while taking into consideration Pennsylvania Coal's admoni-
tion about regulations "going too far," the Robins Court found that the
minimal degree of interference with plaintiff's property rights did not amount
to a taking. 94
State courts have also resorted to a balancing test when only state law is
involved. 9" In State Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter,96 the Washington
Supreme Court confronted a wetlands preservation statute that allegedly
impinged on plaintiff's property rights. The court reaffirmed its approval of
the balancing of private loss against public gain in determining whether
application of the statute had taken or damaged plaintiff's property. The
court stated that "the question essentially is one of social policy which
requires the balancing of the public interest in regulating the use of private
property against the interest of private landowners not to be encumbered by
restrictions on the use of their property." 97
A. Balancing Process- "Or Damaged" States
In the balancing process, especially at the state level, there is a factor that
is not present in Supreme Court decisions, namely, the "or damaged"
constitutions. 98 The "or damaged" clauses were designed to expand com-
pensability beyond the apparent limits of the traditional, physical invasion
92. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
93. Id. at 83 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
94. 447 U.S. at 84-85. See infra note 115.
95. See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975); Brecciaroli v. Connecticut Comm'r of Envt'l Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948
(1975); Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 219 S.E.2d 399 (1975); Wheeling Trust & Sav. Bank
v. County of Lake, 31 111. App. 3d 636, 333 N.E.2d 708 (2d Dist. 1975); State Dept. of Ecology
v. Pacesetter Const., 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977).
Profesor Williams, author of a respected treatise on land use, states that most American
courts eventually apply some sort of "balance-of-benefits" test to determine the validity of
land use regulations. As applied in most jurisdictions, balancing means that courts will not
uphold restrictions which impose a heavy burden on the property owner ("developer"), yet
provide only a minimal gain to the public. 5 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, § 162.06, at 438.
96. 89 Wash. 2d 203, 571 P.2d 196 (1977).
97. Id. at 207, 571 P.2d at 199 (quoting Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. Department of
Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977)).
98. See supra note 6.
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test for taking."9 The landowner's bundle of rights is greater in an "or
damaged" state than it is in a "taking" state."' Hence, a state court in an
"or damaged" state, when confronted with an overregulation balancing
problem, must often tip the balance in favor of compensation due to the
"or damaged" provision.
B. Balancing and Environmental Control
Environmental groups, although well-intentioned, consistently refuse to
recognize the often devastating effects that land use regulations have on
property rights involved in socially desirable projects. At times, environ-
mental groups struggle to block needed housing projects if they sense a
possible harm to the environment. For example, a handbook for environ-
mental activities provides this advice: "The mere threat of a suit can be an
impressive political tactic . . . .Suits can be an effective delaying tactic to
force compromises . . . .Extensive delay may even force the developer to
abandon his plans due to financing difficulties."'" Even though the developer
may have very laudable ends in mind, environmental groups often blindly
proceed with their opposition.
A wetlands case is illustrative of this problem. In Just v. Marinette
County," 2 developers brought suit to declare a shoreland zoning ordinance
unconstitutional. While the public purpose of the ordinance was admirable-
protection of wetlands and prevention of degradation and deterioration
resulting from shoreland development-the destruction of property rights
was devastating. The plaintiffs purchased over thirty-six acres of land along
a lake in Wisconsin. More than six years later, the county enacted an
ordinance to preserve wetlands by placing numerous burdensome conditions
upon the use of the land." 3 In effect, the ordinance destroyed the plaintiffs'
property value by denying them the opportunity to make any practical use
of their land. In response to plaintiffs' eminent domain arguments, the court
simply denied recovery because the property was not physically taken but
had merely been diminished in value. So viewed, the court found the
ordinance a valid exercise of the state's police power." 4
Courts should not be so myopic in the balancing process. When regulatory
losses fall heavily on particular individuals, the police power must give way
to eminent domain where the net result of the loss is the subjection of
private property to public use. Moreover, the environmentalists are not
always right. "Making the world safe for the environment is not the same
thing as making the environment safe for our world."" 5 When a public
99. See Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 15-16.
100. See Aaron v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
101. Frieden, Housing Development is Stifled by Environmental Growth Control Regulation,
38 J. HOUSING 25, 28 (1981).
102. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
103. Id. at 11-12, 201 N.W.2d at 763.
104. Id. at 26, 201 N.W.2d at 773.
105. Kristol, The Environmentalist Crusade, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1974, at 12, col. 4 and 6.
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housing project is planned, for example, a balancing of benefits may counsel
development. Thus, in order to rectify problems such as a shortage of housing
and limited access to credit, the need for a low-income housing development
may supercede the need for environmental preservation.10 6 In the balancing
process, courts must weigh the homeless' need for shelter against regulation
that blocks housing for the poor. Thus, the balancing process becomes an
effective tool to master the complex web of public policy concerns. Once
again, value judgments must be made.
IV. PROPERTY
In an eminent domain situation, courts must determine whether the interest
claimed by the landowner is indeed a "property right" that must be protected
or compensated. For example, in United States v. Willow River Power
Co., 07 the Court held that a riparian owner of a dam that produced a
valuable head of water was not entitled to compensation under the fifth
amendment when a federal navigation improvement substantially reduced
the volume of water controlled by the dam.' While the Court recognized
that the head of water had value, and that the plaintiff had an economic
interest in the water, it reasoned that not all economic interests are "property
rights"; only those economic advantages that the courts recognize as rights
can be protected from interference or require compensation for their inva-
sion. The Court noted that it could not "start the process of decision by
calling such a claim as we have here a 'property right'; whether it is a
property right is really the question to be answered. Such economic uses are
rights only when they are legally protected interests."'' 0 After an extensive
discussion concerning the unique nature of riparian rights, the Court found
that no taking of "property" had occurred.'"
Thus, under the Willow River holding, the labelling of asserted rights as
property rights is not a constructive approach to solving condemnation
problems. All relevant facts must be carefully weighed. Only then can one
balance the public welfare against the private claim and decide whether the
case involves the taking of "property" and is therefore an appropriate one
for testing constitutional issues.
A further complicating factor in determining whether "property" is in-
volved is that state law is often employed to determine "property" for the
purposes of federal condemnation. Thus, in Robins,'" the Court refused to
adopt a more liberal view of property because the United States is not
106. Whitman, Federal Housing Assistance for the Poor: Old Problems and New Directions,
9 URB. LAW I, 3 n.14 (1977) (citing H. AARON, SHELTER AND THE SUBSIDIES 31 (1972)).
107. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
108. Id. at 511.
109. Id. at 502.
110. Id. at 511. A like issue arises where a state agency seeks to violate a general plan of
building restrictions. The issue is whether, against the state, equitable servitudes are property.
4 A.L.R. 3d 1137.
111. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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"possessed of residual authority that enables it to define 'property' in the
first instance."" 2 While federal law may determine the definition of property
in some instances,' 3 federal courts sometimes believe that they should adopt
local state law unless a statutory federal interest is at stake.'
The Supreme Court, however, tends to determine on an ad hoc basis
whether a property right exists. In so doing, the Court at times defines
property more broadly than a state supreme court would. Yet federal and
state definitions manage a peaceful coexistence. Thus, in Robins, the Supreme
Court held that a shopping center owner's property rights included the right
to exclude distributors of pamphlets."15 Nevertheless, the Court respected the
state's regulation and free speech interpretation, permitting the distribution
of pamphlets in shopping centers. "1 6 This apparent paradox of allowing states
to define some substantive rights, such as free speech, more broadly than
the federal courts, while refusing to sanction narrow state interpretations of
other rights, such as property,'' 7 contributes to the diversity of property
rights and complicates the taking issue. As a probable result, states can and
will expand their constitutional definition of protected speech and federal
courts will recognize a shrinkage in the bundle of rights we call property.
When a state court is called upon to define "property" for compensation
purposes under a state constitution, it has the same freedom of choice that
the Supreme Court enjoys under the federal Constitution. As a result,
"property" is virtually undefinable. 8 Since there are fifty state constitutions,
which are construed by fifty state courts in addition to the federal perspective,
there are, in this country, fifty-one distinct notions of the definition of
"property". But, if we recall that "property" has one meaning in a contest
between individuals and another meaning when the issue is between a public
body and the landowner, as demonstrated in Willow River, then the number
of existing solutions must be doubled.
V. BEYOND "PROPERTY"-PROTECTION OF "EXPECTATIONS"
An important philosophical underpinning in contract law is the protection
of the parties' expectations.' 9 This concept of expectation has also crept
into the Court's condemnation decisions.
112. Id. at 84.
113. United States v. Certain Interests in Property, 271 F.2d 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 974 (1959).
114. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (defining property in the
bankruptcy context).
115. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
116. Id. at 81.
117. See Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envt'l Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108
(1981) (discussing Robins' effect on state interpretations); see also THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFER-
ENCE, DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW passim (1985) (commenting on the current
vitality of state constitutional law) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS]; Schlueter, Federalism
and Supreme Court Review of Expansive State Court Decisions: A Response to Unfortunate
mnpressions, II HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 523 (1984).
118. See Broeder, Torts and Just Compensation: Some Personal Reflections, 17 HASTINGS
L.J. 217, 227-28 (1965).
119. See E. FARNSWORTH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 812, 840 (1982); see also
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 57-66 (1936)
(discussing theoretical rationales for protecting expectation interests in contract law).
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In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,2' the owners of a private pond invested
substantial amounts of money to dredge the pond and develop it into an
exclusive marina with a surrounding marina community. The marina was
open only to fee paying members; the fees were used in part to "maintain
the privacy and security of the pond."' 2 ' After acquiescing to the petitioners'
arrangement, the federal government reversed itself and attempted to assert
a public right of access to the improved pond. The government based its
assertion on the theory that the marina was subject to the federal navigational
servitude since the owners had dredged a channel connecting it to navigable
water. 122
The petitioners argued that the right to exclude others had become essential
to the use and economic value of the property.' 23 They contended that to
infringe upon this exclusivity amounted to a taking. The Court agreed with
the petitioners, noting that the government could not interfere with reason-
able investment-backed expectations:
While the consent of individual officials representing the United States
cannot "estop" the United States it can lead to the fruition of a number
of expectancies embodied in the concept of "property,"-expectancies
that, if sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay
for before it takes over the management of the landowner's property. In
this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of
interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.'24
This language in Kaiser Aetna exemplifies a time-honored principle behind
legal concepts-respect of expectations. Indeed, as other commentators have
noted, respect for individuals' "basis of expectations" goes back to Bent-
ham's teachings. 25 Professor Michelman has argued that "investment-backed
expectations" and "property expectancies" are to be protected "if suffi-
ciently important.'" 6
It is interesting and probably significant that the Kaiser Aetna Court
employed a vocabulary devoid of any mention of "vested rights." Perhaps
120. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
121. Id. at 168.
122. Id. at 167-68.
123. Id. at 168.
124. Id. at 179.
125. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 1211. Bentham's utilitarian property theory troubled
Michelman because the theory does not mandate compensation in every case of society action
"which is disappointing to justified, investment-based expectations." Id. at 1211. Michelman
found no difficulty in denying compensation, provided that utilitarian theorists agreed that
"human interdependence" requires that sound allocation of resources be based on collective
control over property rights. This collective control and resulting allocation of resources,
according to Michelman, will inevitably upset "justifiable expectations" of individuals in
situations where it would be almost impossible "to arrive at a comprehensive set of apparently
'correct' compensation settlements." Id. at 1213.
126. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1213. In Professor Michelman's classic exposition of the
just compensation clause, he asserted that Pennsylvania Coal essentially employed a test that
gauged "whether or not the measure in question can be seen to have practically deprived the
claimant of some distinctly-perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation." Id.
at 1233.
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the court sought to avoid the barnacles that have attached to that hoary
concept'2 by substituting instead a quest for fairness, a new quest for the
ethical foundations of just compensation. The Court may have provided a
signal that the consent of individual governmental officials may indeed lead
to the fruition of expectancies embodied in the concept of property-
expectancies of sufficient importance to require compensation upon infringe-
ment. Such fruition would require investments by the landowner of a char-
acter and magnitude not yet fully defined. But this fruition would qualify
these investment-backed expectations for protection against taking without
compensation.
The Court, then, has offered some direction as to the location of the line
marking the point where eminent domain territory begins. But the exact
point where police power ends and eminent domain begins remains a mys-
tery. 128
VI. NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
Since under the American value system the doctrines of natural law and
natural rights extend protection to private property, it is essential to consider
natural rights in the balancing process to determine the right to compensation.
The earliest mention of natural rights in federal jurisprudence occurred in
the case of Corfield v. Coryell in 1823.129 According to Corfield, certain
unstated "natural rights" exist that all governments must respect.13' Even
127. Before the concept of investment-backed expectations was introduced, developers relied,
at times, on the kindred doctrines of vested rights and estoppel to protect against zoning
changes occuring after they made substantial expenditures. See Cunningham & Kramer, Vested
Rights, Estoppel and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625 (1978); Hagman,
Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-land Use Permits, II S.W.U. L. REV. 545 (1979).
In fact, in a celebrated case, a court refused to apply vested rights or estoppel after huge
expenditures were made. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional
Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1976).
It was probably this case that brought forth the Urban Land Institute paper. SIEMON, LARSON,
AND PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS (Urban Land Institute and Urban Land Research Fund, 1982).
The authors argued that investment-backed expectations created vested rights. They argued that
it is constitutionally impermissible to alter regulations affecting a land development if: (1) the
development expectation was reasonable and final when it was formulated; (2) the expectation
is investment-backed; (3) impairment of the investment-backed expectation is substantial; and
(4) the new or changed regulation cannot bear strict or active judicial scrutiny by which the
court determines whether the law in question is necessary to promote a compelling government
interest.
In any event, the results under estoppel and vested rights theories have been uneven. See
Bosselman, Survey of Recent Court Decisions, 1984 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, LAND USE
AND LITIGATION; Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel
and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 63 (discussing zoning estoppel and
vested rights cases).
128. For an interesting and insightful discussion of individual rights as pre-existing legislative
rights in society, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY x-xi (1977).
129. 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-51 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). See generally L. TRIBE, supra
note 52, at 405.
130. See L. TRIBE supra note 52, at 405.
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the Magna Carta was but a fragmentary statement of such rights. 3' The
Supreme Court, it is claimed, never acceded to the doctrine of natural rights,
at least in its majority opinions.3 2 However, the Court seems to have adopted
through construction of the Constitution a doctrine of fundamental rights
in equal protection that is closely analogous to the natural rights doctrine.,
Notions of natural rights continue to play a role in constitutional adju-
dication.'34 For example, in 1934, when, during the Great Depression, the
very survival of our form of government was in grave doubt, the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine the validity of a Minnesota law which
granted a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures.' To sustain this law, the
Court was compelled to recognize the obvious fact that impairment of
contracts, expressly forbidden by the Constitution, must nevertheless be
permitted when the survival of government is at stake. The Court sustained
the moratorium, stating:
But into all contracts, ... there enter conditions which arise not out of
the literal terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced by the pre-
existing and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations, or of the
community to which the parties belong .... ,16
Later, in a substantive due process decision, Griswold v. Connecticut, '7
the Court struck down a Connecticut statute forbidding any person from
"aiding or abetting" the distribution of birth control devices. 38 The majority
found that a penumbra of constitutional rights supported recognition of a
right of privacy in the fourteenth amendment. Three concurring justices, in
an opinion written by Justice Goldberg, preferred to rely instead on the
ninth amendment.' 319 Citing this and later Supreme Court decisions, one
commentator has concluded that a type of quasi-natural law will continue
to be incorporated as an important element in the American political sys-
tem. 140
Other commentators have found support in the ninth amendment for the
notion that recently conceived constitutional rights can be traced to the
natural rights tradition that is deeply embedded in our constitutional origins.,
131. Id. at 428.
132. Id. at 406.
133. Id. at 407.
134. Id.
135. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blasdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
136. Id. at 435-36 (emphasis added).
137. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
138. Id. at 481.
139. Id. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The ninth amendment provides that: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
140. See P. SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 109 (1971) (discussing the views
of the philosophers, the Hart-Fuller debate, papal encyclicals, the judgment at Nuremburg and
a vast diversity of commentaries on natural law).
141. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 149, 152-53 (1928); Gray, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 717 (1975); see generally Forte, On Teaching Natural Law, 29 J. LEGAL ED. 413 (1978)
(an analysis of various schools of thought related to the teaching of natural law philosophies).
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One decision often cited is Serrano v. Priest, 142 in which the California court
quoted Horace Mann's exposition of the "great, immortal principles of
natural law.' '1 41 Natural law, it seems, simply refuses to die.
The early history of natural rights in American eminent domain law has
been interestingly recounted. '4 Early American cases and treatises utilized a
natural law approach to eminent domain.' 45 Mills, in an old treatise, reasoned
that in the absence of a constitutional provision for compensation, any law
for the taking of property without compensation would be void.' 46 In Chi-
cago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 47 the Court, relying on
natural law authorities, held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required the states to pay just compensation when taking private
property for public use. The Burlington case and its natural law predecessors
most clearly establish the true nature of the power of eminent domain.
In the purest sense, there is no such thing as the power of eminent domain.
For the states, eminent domain is merely a limitation on its police power
which is basically the power of a sovereign to govern.' 4 Indeed, it has been
said that the phrase "police power" is a misnomer and should not be used
as a substitute for the power to govern."' The term "police power" is not
found in the federal or state constitutions, but is generally considered to be
a grant from the people to their governmental agents.""1 As the Burlington
Court noted, under early state constitutions that had no eminent domain
provisions, the states encountered no difficulty in requiring payment of
compensation for taking private property for public use." '
The fifth amendment assumes that the power to take private property
for public use inheres in the federal government as an attribute of sovereignty,
but provides that exercise of this power is subject to the limitation that
compensation be paid. Thus, in Richmond Elks Hall Association v. Rich-
mond Redevelopment,' 52 the court of appeals concluded that Supreme Court
precedent clearly required that a governmental agency acting pursuant to the
state's police power must pay just compensation for any taking it effects.' -
142. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
143. Id. at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
144. See Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1931);
Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV. 67
(1931).
145. See Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31 (1847); Gardner v. Village of Newburg, 2 Johns Ch.
162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
146. J. MILLS, supra note 27, §§ I, 2.
147. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
148. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); see also Berger, supra note 38,
at 272.
149. See Linde, Without Due Process, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 147 (1970) (concluding that
"police power" terminology is a "source of genuine confusion" and should be abandoned by
both courts and lawyers).
150. See generally, Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth
Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J.
15, 51-53 (1983) (discussing interplay between police power and eminent domain).
151. 166 U.S. at 248.
152. 541 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1977).
153. Id. at 1332.
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As the Supreme Court, in Boom Co. v. Patterson, stated:
The right of eminent domain, that is the right to take private property
for public uses, appertains to every independent government. It requires
no constitutional recognition; it is an attribute to sovereignty. The clause
found in the Constitutions of the several States providing for just com-
pensation for property taken is a mere limitation upon the exercise of the
right."'
Many commentators have also noted the unitary nature of police power and
eminent domain. 155
In sum, the American value system employs diverse sources in creating a
barrier of protection around private property. The doctrines of natural law
and natural rights form part of that barrier. In addition, there are the fifth
amendment, the fourteenth amendment, and constitutional provisions in
each of the fifty states. In a majority of the states the "or damaged" clause
furnishes added proof that the people wanted protection greater than that
offered by the federal Constitution. Incorporation of property protection in
the Bill of Rights is significant. 5 6 Thus, in America, private property rights
are fundamental civil rights. 5 7
VII. STATE AND FEDERAL LAW COMPARED
Every state has provisions parallel to the due process and equal protection
clauses of the United States Constitution." 8 Constitutional challenges to
economic regulations can therefore be made on state or federal grounds.'59
Surprisingly, however, parties in state-based cases often rely on federal
grounds even though the Supreme Court has abdicated the field of substantive
due process. 6o
Unfortunately, zoning decisions often fail to pinpoint the particular con-
stitutional provision involved and dismiss the litigated issue with the mean-
ingless observation that the zoning was "confiscatory." This approach leaves
to the reader's imagination the problem of determining whether state or
federal constitutional law was involved.' 6' The federal/state distinction, how-
ever, can be crucial to the case.
154. 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
155. See Berger, supra, note 2, at 273; Kanner, supra note 2, at 893; Morgan & Shonkwiler,
supra note 55, at 605.
Professor Williams has suggested a useful formula to determine whether state or federal law
defines the scope of the police power. I N. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at §2.04. According to
Williams, when a federal question is involved the federal courts will define the permissible
scope of the police power, as Pennsylvania Coal holds. When no federal question is involved,
each state court should define the scope of the police power for its jurisdiction.
156. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
157. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 911 (1972).
158. See citations contained in Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation
Under States Constitutions: The Case of Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241, 242-43 n.4 (1981).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 246.
161. See Smith, The Uncertain State of Zoning Law in Illinois, 60 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 93
(1984).
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It would be helpful at this point to discuss two decisions, one state and
one federal, that deal with identical problems. In Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,' 2 the Supreme Court considered a zoning ordinance which permitted
only single-family dwellings within the municipality and which restricted the
occupancy of such buildings to groups related by blood or marriage, or to
no more than two unrelated persons. The Supreme Court held that this did
not violate the federal Constitution. Under an equal protection analysis, the
Court reasoned that no fundamental constitutional rights were involved., 3
Notwithstanding Belle Terre, courts in a number of states have sustained
challenges to ordinances which exclude group homes from single-family
districts. "4 For example, in State v. Baker,' 5 Dennis Baker was the owner
and co-resident of a single-family dwelling located in Plainfield, New Jersey.
Residing with Baker were his wife, three daughters, and a Mrs. Conata and
her three children. The residents contended that they constituted an "ex-
tended family" because they held common religious beliefs. The "family"
ate together, shared common areas and held communal prayer sessions. The
defendants were found by the trial court to have violated an ordinance
comparable to that in Belle Terre. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme
Court found the ordinance violative of the New Jersey Constitution.' 6 The
city relied on Belle Terre, but the court observed:
Belle Terre has been widely criticized by the commentators .... In any
event Belle Terre is at most dispositive of any federal constitutional
question here involved. We, of course, remain free to interpret our con-
stitution and statutes more stringently .... We find the reasoning of Belle
Terre to be .... unpersuasive.' 7
The relevant language of the various state constitutions varies somewhat,
though many are patterned after the federal constitution. In any event, state
courts have continued to interfere freely with legislative policies when inter-
preting a due process clause or its equivalent in a state constitution. Sub-
stantive due process is very much alive in the state courts.' There remains
for each state court the problem of defining the content of state due process
in its jurisdiction.""6 Thus, in any situation when courts are called upon to
apply substantive due process in a land use situation, there are fifty varieties
of state due process, as well as due process as construed by lower federal
court and ultimately defined by the Supreme Court.
The Pennsylvania Coal taking clause approach to limiting regulation allows
a compromise in which legislatures remain free to regulate social problems,
162. 416 U.S 1 (1974).
163. Id. at 9.
164. See Birke, Challenging Restrictive Fainiy Definitions in Zoning Ordinance: City of
Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 23 URE. L. ANN. 307, 316 (1982).
165. 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
166. Id. at 109, 405 A.2d at 374.
167. Id; see also DEVELOPMENTS supra note 117, passim; Schlueter supra note 117, passim.
168. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53
Nw. U. L. REV. 13, 26 (1958); Pauleen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the
State, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
169. See Hetherington, supra note 168, at 25.
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economics, and land uses. The courts may then infuse their values and policy
into particular cases involving particular tracts of land and protect specific
individuals and their property from extreme instances of regulation. 7
In struggling to absorb the meaning of this great diversity of constitutional
interpretation in land use situations, the NO TRESPASSING signs must be
kept in mind. The federal courts must not intrude into the process of
constitutional law interpretation where a state court, duly respecting the
requirements of federal constitutional law and federal statutes, gives its own
interpretation of its state law. '
VIII. THE QUESTION OF REMEDIES
Grotius, a sixteenth century Dutch lawyer-philosopher, is credited with
coining the expression "eminent domain." Grotius stated that all subjects
(persons) hold their property subject to the eminent domain of the state.' 2
In so stating, Grotius could not have meant that we are all doomed to have
our property taken by the government. A more appropriate characterization
might be that we all hold our property subject to the preeminent dominion
or the police power of the state. But when that police power is indeed
exercised to take property for public use, Grotius stated that compensation
must be paid.' 73 Grotius, an authority on natural law, merely arrived at the
same conclusion later drawn by early American authorities-that taking
requires compensation.
Grotius is also credited with the first serious development of the doctrine
that government was instituted by a social contract. 7 4 Recognizing that
"social contract" is a figure of speech, it is nevertheless reasonable to infer
that, like other contracts, the contract that forms a government is to be
given a reasonable construction. Governments so formed must act reasona-
bly. They may regulate property but they must respect the natural rights of
every person, including the property owner.
A. Compensation
When the legislature breaches the social compact by regulating unreason-
ably, to the financial detriment of a landowner, the judicial branch must
take action. The judicial branch exercises a vast amount of discretion when
it initiates such action since decisions that balance the private and public
factors involved are ad hoc.'75 Nevertheless, some argue that the court cannot
or must not award compensation. 7 6 Even though there is a violation of the
just compensation clause, it is argued that the relief must be non-monetary.17
170. See Ragsdale & Sher, supra note 88, at 86.
171. Jankovich v. Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
172. See I P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.12(l) at 1-14 (Rohan ed. 1981).
173. Id.
174. See B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 630 (1945).
175. See Kelso, Substantive Due Process as a Limit on Police Power Regulatory Takings, 20
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 20 (1984).
176. Id. at 26-27.
177. Id. at 27.
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The Supreme Court, in a number of statements, has expressly embraced
the requirement of compensation. 78 There is nothing ambiguous about the
Court's statements. In the Brennan formula, 79 a majority of the Supreme
Court agreed that damages may be awarded for overregulation. In fact, a
panoply of remedies presents itself."'
The Model Land Development Code contains a provision for retention of
jurisdiction:
If the complainant is a landowner challenging the validity of an order,
rule or ordinance applicable to his land and if the court is satisfied that
as applied to his land the order, rule or ordinance constitutes a taking of
his property without just compensation, the court shall retain jurisdiction
if it further determines that the limitation or development could be lawfully
imposed if compensation were paid, and request the local government to
determine whether it wishes to institute proceedings under Article 5 to pay
compensation. If the governmental agency making the order, rule or
ordinance fails to respond within 90 days, the court shall enter an order
of invalidity. If a proceeding to determine compensation is commenced,
the court shall continue the initial proceeding until compensation has been
determined."'
It is evident that this provision introduces the notion that an otherwise
invalid regulation might be validated by payment of compensation. The
178. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S 419, 425 (1982)
("It is a separate question ... whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property
rights that compensation must be paid"); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S 590, 594
(1962) (government action in the form of regulation may be so onerous as to constitute a taking
which requires compensation). The Court further explained in Martin v. District of Columbia,
205 U.S. 135 (1907), that "[clonstitutional rights, like others, are matters of degree. To illustrate:
Under the police power, in its strict sense, a certain limit might be set to the height of buildings
without compensation; but to make that limit five feet would require compensation and a
taking by eminent domain." Id. at 139.
179. See supra notes 57-87 and accompanying text.
180. See Zaagman v. City of Kentwood, 406 Mich. 137, 277 N.W.2d 475 (1979); Note, The
Reasoning Dilemma: What May a Court Do with An Invalid Zoning Classification, 25 S.D.
L. REV. 116 (1980). The student commentator set forth the alternatives as follows:
The choices of relief, according to the Zaagman opinion, include (I) enjoining
enforcement of the unconstitutional relief, thus leaving the property unzoned, (2)
enjoining enforcement of any zoning classification other than that sought by the
plaintiff, (3) enjoining enforcement of the invalid classification while ordering the
city to allow plaintiff's specific use, (4) enjoining enforcement and remanding to
the city, but retaining supervision of the choice of an alternative use, to be
determined be equitable considerations as well as constitutional standards, and (5)
enjoining enforcement and remanding for a local administrative hearing to decide
the appropriate use. The Zaagman court adopted the fourth choice, while the dissent
supported the last.
Id. at 117.
181. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 9-112(3) (1976). The comment to this section is as follows:
In subsection (3) the court is given a third choice. If it finds that the development
restriction as applied to complainant's land would result in a taking of his property
without compensation, the court may stay entry of an order of invalidity to give
the local government time to determine whether it wishes to continue the restriction
by paying compensation through the acquisition of some interest in the land pursuant
to § 5-106.
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amount of the compensation would correspond to the quantum of harm
inflicted by the regulation and the overall circumstances. The concept of
compensatory regulation is not new. 182 This, indeed, was tried in the early
days of zoning, when zoning without compensation for loss of value was
thought to be unconstitutional.8 3 Compensatory regulation has even been
revived in one state by statute." 4
Nevertheless, the dispute over compensatory regulations remains." 5 The
differences are deep and real. The problems of fixing appropriate compen-
sation are difficult, but constitutional law does not present the obstacle. The
analogy of the glass of water seems relevant. The filled glass of water
represents unregulated ownership. Overregulation empties too much water,
leaving too little for the ownership. Then, by means of compensation pro-
visions, enough water is added to reach the line that marks the division
between police power and eminent domain territory.' 6
It is clear that a landowner who suffers physical invasion is entitled to
compensation. But if he suffers serious damage without physical invasion,
there are those who argue that money damages cannot be recovered. Yet, it
is clear that overregulation requires some form of constitutional relief. The
only question that remains is what kind of relief is permitted. No constitu-
tional provision forbids monetary relief. Indeed, where the constitutions
speak, they speak of compensation. A court that chooses to award damages
for overregulation is constitutionally free to do so.
The principal argument against awarding damages in a zoning case is the
fiscal argument. But this argument has been pretty well demolished by the
Supreme Court's new interpretation of Section 1983.817 Under Section 1983,
a local government may be liable in damages for an unconstitutional dep-
rivation of a person's civil rights. Similarly, when the government damages
the property rights of a landowner, the government should pay for the
damage it caused. 88
B. Judicial Rezoning
Judicial rezoning has periodically taken place. 8 9 Commentators have also
approved site-specific relief. 90 The doctrine of separation of powers at first
182. See D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS AND WIPEOUTS 256 (1978).
183. See Mandelker, Land Use Takings, The Compensation Issue, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
491, 505 n.41 (1981).
184. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (2) (Purdon's Supp. 1980).
185. See D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 182, at 261.
186. The illustration is adapted from City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807, 813
(Mo. 1969).
187. See infra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
188. See Kanner, The Consequence of Taking Property by Regulation, 24 PRAC. LAW. 65,
74-75 (1978). Professor Kanner believes that the issue of the validity of condemnation with
compensation has been decided by the Supreme Court. The author agrees with Professor
Kanner's views.
189. See Shenk v. Zoning Comm'n, 440 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Southern Alameda
Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 357 F.Supp. 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
190. See Mandelker, supra note 183, at 505; Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in
Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REV. 760, 770 (1977) (viewing judicial zoning as a
method for dealing with municipal zoning officials' reluctance to obey court ordered rezoning).
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blush seems to indicate that zoning and rezoning can be exercised only by
the legislative branch.
In LaSalle National Bank v. City of Chicago, " the Illinois court attempted
to define its role:
While the courts possess the authority to pass upon the validity of a
zoning ordinance, this authority does not include the power to determine
the ultimate classification . ... Since the practical effect of declaring an
existing zoning ordinance void in regard to a particular piece of property
is to leave that piece of property in an unzoned condition, the court may
frame its order in reference to a specific proposal before it and find that
the contemplated use would be a reasonable one . . . .However, the court
must exercise this authority with extreme care to avoid any encroachment
into the legislative function of zoning."2
A simpler, more direct remedy would be for the court to order the city to
issue a permit to proceed with the use that the court finds reasonable. Of
course, this solution is facially simplistic. For example, the local code usually
contains mandatory housing and building code provisions. Judicial decrees,
however, are usually confined to the issues at bar. Thus, any court judgment
that issues a permit must make it plain that the parties must comply with
appropriate provisions of the existing code. The court should then reserve
jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, as has been done in desegregation
cases. 93 For example, visits by the building inspector twice each day could
frustrate construction. Local officials are perfectly capable of this sort of
misconduct.' 94 By a reserving jurisdiction, the court could end such harrass-
ment. ,95
When the legislative branch obstinately refuses to exercise a function
mandated by the constitution, the judiciary must intervene since the people
have no place else to go.' 96 The Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr'9 7 ordered
191. 130 Ill. App. 2d 456, 264 N.E.2d 799 (1970).
192. Id. at 460, 264 N.E.2d at 801 (emphasis added).
193. See Note, supra note 190, at 775.
194. Id. at 768.
195. See Krasnowieki, Securing Definitive Relief for the Developer: An Overview, 3 ZONING
PLAN. REP. I, 5 (1980).
196. Viewing the doctrine of separation of powers in its historical context is helpful. As
Pound has pointed out, the real roots of the separation of powers doctrine in America can be
traced back to the despotic character of the royal proprietors in the colonies:
In the proprietary colonies the proprietors and their agents wielded all the powers
of governors, lawmakers and judges as well as of owners. In one case when a
judgment had been rendered in the Town Court at Savannah, the defeated litigant
wrote a letter to the Trustees in London complaining of the court's action. The
letter having been read by the secretary, the Trustees without more, voted that the
secretary write a letter to the governor on the spot directing him to order the court
to reverse the judgment. Under the provincial regime, all the ultimate power was
concentrated in the Privy Council at Westminster. All legislation had to be submitted
to it for approval or disallowance ....
Pound, The Revival of Natural Law, 17 NOTRE DAME LAW. 287, 345 (1942).
The British proprietors have long since vanished from the scene. A mature system of justice
can afford a relaxed attitude toward the arbitrary division of governmental power between the
legislative and judicial branches.
197. 368 U.S. 186 (1962).
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congressional redistricting although it had previously denied the Court's
authority to do so; the legislature had refused to correct an intolerable
situation. As Justice Clark observed in a concurring opinion, the voters were
"caught up in a legislative strait jacket.'" 98 Similarly, in Reynolds v. Sims, 99
the Court dealt with state legislative apportionment. Thereafter, the Supreme
Court proceeded to regulate much of the American voting process. 2' These
cases serve to emphasize the point already made that when the legislature
fails to do its constitutionally-imposed duty, courts must step in to correct
the constitutional infirmity.
Occasionally, under special circumstances, the compartmentalization of
governmental functions into legislative and judicial branches must yield to
the needs of the times. When this happens, mountains do not topple and
oceans do not engulf the civilized world. In fact, life continues much as
usual, and the new rule is accepted, not defied.
In land use situations, New Jersey has taken a novel and independent
course. Various municipalities ignored the New Jersey Supreme Court when
it ordered them to make provision for low and moderate income housing.
The court, however, had the last word. In South Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel,2"' the New Jersey Supreme Court assigned
three judges to manage zoning cases on a statewide basis to ensure that local
government did not block construction of housing for a low income group.
Thus, for courts that are truly dedicated to the task of providing homes for
the homeless, a precedent has been established.
That rezoning is not merely an academic exercise is evident from the
Mount Laurel decision, where the court pointed out that a housing study
made in 1972 indicated that the selling price of a new single family home
could be reduced from $57,618 to $33,843 if the lot size and frontage
requirements were reduced from 43,500 square feet and 200 feet to 12,000
square feet and 80 feet respectively.20 2 Under Mount Laurel, courts may
require the use of available state or federal housing subsidies by local
governments.2 11 Inclusionary and incentive zoning must be used. 204 Mobile
homes must be permitted. 20 1 "Least cost" housing must be provided. 216 Above
all, to make certain that the municipalities do not again resort to evasive
tactics, the court determined that masters in chancery would "assist" the
local governments in the drafting of proper ordinances. 20 7 In short, Mount
198. Id. at 195 (Clark, J., concurring).
199. 377 U.S. 533, reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964).
200. See Gindo, Deviation and Justifications: Standards and Remedies in Challenge to
Reapportionment Plans, 14 URB. LAW. 57 (1982) (tracing the judicial history of reapportionment
plans).
201. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
202. Id. at 259 n.25, 456 A.2d at 441-42 n.25.
203. Id. at 262-64, 456 A.2d at 443.
204. Id. at 265-67, 456 A.2d at 445-50.
205. Id. at 274-77, 456 A.2d at 450-51.
206. Id. at 277-78, 456 A.2d at 451.
207. Id. at 281, 456 A.2d at 453.
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Laurel supports the view that in reaching a desired land use result the courts
may resort to the judicial activism common in cases involving school deseg-
regation, prison overcrowding, and reapportionment. 28
To be sure, there will be criticism of Mount Laurel that expresses the
traditional view that the judiciary should avoid intruding into the legislative
sphere. This criticism is unwarranted. Pinning labels on a process does not
move the analysis forward. When legislative bodies act improperly and persist
in so doing, there will be instances of extreme injustice, as in Mount Laurel,
that must be rectified. When the judiciary is the only remaining bastion of
redress, courts should not hesitate to fulfill their counter-majoritarian pur-
pose and prevent the abuse. 20 9
Finally, what occurs at trial when a zoning action is attacked as invalid
"as applied" must be considered. During the trial, the zoning ordinance and
the local master plan, as well as maps and photographs of the area, are in
evidence. The judge is informed of all the surrounding properties' uses,
zoning, and value. Expert witnesses testify. In short, before making a ruling,
the judge must have all the information a zoning body would have in order
to zone the land properly.
Under these circumstances, the separation of powers doctrine, in its broad
sense, is not involved. Virtually all zoning cases involve one tract of land
and the issue usually involves the simple question of whether a piece of
property deserves a specific classification. Most likely, a judge can make
this decision with at least as great wisdom as large groups of aldermen. All
great powers must be applied reasonably, and judicial zoning is certainly a
reasonable solution to a difficult problem. Moreover, the background of the
problem reveals a bad track record on the part of legislative bodies. Had
legislatures dealt honestly, fairly, and competently with the problem, the
question would never have arisen.
C. Section 1983
No important land use cases have been decided by the Supreme Court
under Section 1983.211 It would be premature to draw any hard conclusions
208. Id. at 289 n.43, 456 A.2d at 457 n.43.
209. For a general discussion of judicial rezoning, see Hartman, Beyond Invalidation: The
Judicial Power to Zone, 9 URB. L. ANN. 159 (1975). Where a separation of powers is ordained
and conflict occurs, the power to resolve the conflict must reside somewhere if use of force is
to be avoided. This was succinctly put by Bertrand Russell:
The country where Locke's principle of the division of powers has found its
fullest application is the United States, where the President and Congress are wholly
independent of each other, and the Supreme Court is independent of both. Inad-
vertently, the Constitution made the Supreme Court a branch of the legislature,
since nothing is a law if the Supreme Court says it is not. The fact that its powers
are nominally only interpretative in reality increases those powers, since it makes it
difficult to criticize what are supposed to be purely legal decisions. It says a very
great deal for the political sagacity of Americans that this Constitution has only
once led to armed conflict.
B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 640 (1945).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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based on the decisional law to date. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette2 1 is
one lower court decision of considerable interest. In Hernandez, the land-
owner alleged that the city improperly refused to rezone his land from single-
family to office complex purposes. The court held that plaintiff had stated
a cause of action under section 1983, stating:
It is well established that the application of a general zoning law to a
particular property will effect a taking of that property under the just
compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment (made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment) if the ordinance denies the owner
any economically viable use of his land.112
Thus, when invalidation of harsh land use regulations leaves the landowner
with uncompensated losses caused by the invalid regulation, federal courts
seem disposed to award damages under section 1983.213 An action to inval-
idate the regulation and to recover damages should be maintainable whether
brought under the due process clause or section 1983.
D. Inverse Condemnation
The arguments against any use of inverse condemnation as a remedy for
compensating a regulated landowner who has been deprived of constitutional
rights have been discussed frequently. It is argued that the threat of inverse
condemnation has a chilling effect on the exercise of the police power at a
local level. Second, it is argued that it is unfair to treat what the local
government enacted as a purely regulatory measure as a compensable taking.
Third, many argue that inverse condemnation puts an unanticipated burden
on the local budget. Fourth, it is argued that inverse condemnation amounts
to a judicial usurpation of the legislative prerogative. Finally, it is asserted
that the amount of compensation necessary to compensate injured landown-
ers will be difficult to ascertain. 214
None of these arguments carries conviction. A court of general jurisdiction
that regularly hears judicial attacks on zoning decisions is competent to
control the practice in inverse condemnation cases. It is entirely within
judicial competence to insist that the relief granted in such actions depend
on the facts and may run the gamut of all remedies available where a zoning
decision is attacked.
When the legislature has performed its sworn duties honestly and without
bias, but has nevertheless passed an unconstitutional zoning regulation, the
211. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
212. Id. at 1197.
213. See Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory Taking," 8
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 541 (1981). For examples of judicial approval of the § 1983 remedy
for violations of the just compensation clause in exclusionary zoning cases, see Heritage Homes
of Attelboro, Inc. v. Seekonk Water Dist., 670 F.2d I (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120
(1982); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 664 F.2d 99 (11 th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
973 (1982); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
214. See Cunningham, supra note 213, at 536 (summarizing arguments for inverse condem-
nation).
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court can simply invalidate the regulation and leave the matter of reaching
a correct decision to the legislative body. The legislative body would then
function under the guidance of the court decision.
If, on the other hand, the legislative body chooses wilfully to disobey a
constitutional mandate, it is obvious that the court must choose a remedy
that will command respect. It is unrealistic to speak of unfairness to a
wilfully disobedient legislative body. It is unrealistic to suggest that the
legislature was unaware of the burdens its conduct might place on the
shoulders of the taxpayers. It is unrealistic to talk of usurption of legislative
power, for if the legislature had done its sworn duty the action would never
have been brought in the first instance.
The issue is simple: either courts will pronounce vacuous judgments that
the legislature is free to evade, or courts must seize whatever weapons are
at hand to compel obedience to their orders. In appropriate cases, the remedy
of awarding full compensation should be employed. But damages of full
land value are a remedy of last resort, as in cases of obvious harassment. 2
Critics of inverse condemnation lament the burden this remedy would
impose on the public fisc. This argument loses credence when one considers
recent Supreme Court interpretations of section 1983. While the resultant
financial burden in these cases is great, it is necessary in order to deter
unlawful conduct by governmental officials. 26 It may be legitimately inferred
that the Court was shocked and angered by the despotic and irresponsible
conduct of local officials in their management of local affairs, as revealed,
for example, in the San Diego Gas case, and decided that imposition of
liability was the only language such officials could understand. Moreover,
exposing the government to financial liability spreads the individual loss to
those receiving the benefit-the public. To impose the burden of wrongful
governmental action on the innocent landowner is unduly harsh and op-
pressive.
E. Choice of Remedy
When a number of remedies are available, the power to choose among
the several remedies must be located somewhere. The airport cases strongly
suggest that this power must not be left to the landowner. The landowners
in airport cases have not been permitted to invoke the injunction remedy
even though airport noise makes their homes unlivable. 2 7 Leaving the choice
entirely in the municipality's hands also seems unwise. At times a municipality
that has honestly exceeded its regulatory powers simply pays for the loss of
use the landowner has already suffered. But to allow the municipality to
accept invalidation of one ordinance while its lawyers prepare another invalid
215. See Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use Permits, II Sw. U.
L. REV. 545, 574 (1976).
216. See Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
217. See Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damnages-A New Cause of Action, 5 URB.
LAW. 25, 49 (1973).
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ordinance is folly. Plainly, the choice must ultimately rest with the court.
At times, of course, the court's decision will leave much to be desired. But
in such an event the parties have a right of appeal and the reviewing court
ultimately must face the legal community.
CONCLUSION
Despite many years of bitter attack by commentators, Pennsylvania Coal
remains a landmark decision. Approved by subsequent decisions, Pennsyl-
vania Coal is the firmly established law of the land. When the court states
that overregulation may require payment of compensation, (and it has said
so time after time) it means exactly that. According to the Brennan formula,
when a regulation is invalidated the landowner is entitled to compensation
for the period of time he or she has been unable to make use of the land
because of the regulation.
A restatement of the present situation as it exists under Pennsylvania Coal
and the Brennan formula now follows. A state can condemn the fee simple
title to land for a public purpose, such as the creation of a park, and must
pay just compensation for the land thus acquired. Here the govenment's
intention to acquire is crystal clear. Alternatively, the state may choose to
attempt to regulate the land by zoning the land exclusively for public park
purposes. Here the state has not selected the traditional remedy of condem-
nation, but its intention to "take" is still clear. A state court may decide
that under its state constitution the only available remedy is invalidation of
the regulation. But since a federal constitutional issue is also present, the
remedy that the Supreme Court will choose is one within the exclusive
control of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has determined that an
award of damages is an appropriate remedy for the period that the landowner
was deprived of the use of his land. Thus, if a state court stops with an
adjudication of invalidity, it has stopped short of a full federal remedy
under the Brennan formula for the period the land was unusable. If the
state legislative body reveals an unconstitutional intent by persistently at-
tempting to impose an invalid regulation, the court may elect to view the
state action as tantamount to a permanent taking and may award full market
value compensation.
Determining whether a public action creates a taking is a task that involves
an ad hoc inquiry in which several factors are particularly significant: the
economic impact of the regulation (notably the extent to which the regulation
seems to strip the land of its economic value), the extent to which the
regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations, and the character
of the governmental action. Physical invasions, for example, are almost
certain to constitute a "taking."
It would be helpful if some procedural changes were instituted. A special
action should be available to attack a land use regulation on constitutional
grounds. Optional remedies should be spelled out. Provision should be made
for a final and appealable judgment that nevertheless allows the court to
retain jurisdiction to protect the landowner against harassment and adjudicate
the validity of an amendatory ordinance. In this fashion, the case will not
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lose its place in the trial call and a judge familiar with the facts can try the
new issue.
When the court has plainly delineated its views on the appropriate zoning,
and the municipality thereafter adopts an amendment that disregards the
court's decision, difficult questions arise. The Supreme Court has stated that
when a constitutional violation occurs, all reasonable methods must be made
available to formulate an effective remedy, as shown in the school segregation
cases. This may mean judicial rezoning, the granting of a permit without
rezoning, or a judgment for full market value in inverse condemnation. The
court may also retain jurisdiction to oversee compliance by local officials.
Thus, land use cases will join racial discrimination cases and school
discrimination cases, with the trial courts retaining jurisdiction to make
certain the judicial decisions are not merely exercises in futility and that the
legislative body in fact obeys the mandate of the court. Under these condi-
tions, the rigid line between judicial and legislative power will tend to give
way to a more fluid and workable concept that recognizes the elementary
fact that if all branches of the government are equally "supreme," govern-
ment is impossible. The judicial branch will do whatever is necessary to see
that justice is done.
Finally, mention must be made of the new dedication of state courts to
significant re-interpretation of their state constitutions. As state courts re-
interpret, new state constitutional rights are certain to emerge and some of
them will cause a federally recognized shrinkage of property rights. This is
forward movement. To be sure, it will make the problem of defining property
more complex, but the world we live in shows no sign of diminishing
complexity.
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